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ABSTRACT 
 
What have been the determinants of financial volatility in the transition countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? This paper posits that institutional changes, 
and in particular the volatility of crucial institutions such as property rights, have been the 
major causes of financial volatility in transition. Building a unique monthly database of 20 
transition economies from 1991-2017, this paper applies the GARCH family of models to 
examine financial volatility as a function of institutional volatility. The results show that 
more advanced institutions help to dampen financial sector volatility, while institutional 
volatility feeds through directly to financial sector volatility in transition. Democratic changes 
in particular engender much higher levels of volatility, while property rights are sensitive to 
the metric used for their measurement. 
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1. Introduction 
Policy uncertainty as a determinant of financial and economic outcomes, while not a new 
phenomenon (Ferderer and Zalewski 1994), has enjoyed a renaissance in the economic 
literature recently. Work spearheaded by Baker et al. (2016) has highlighted the different 
dimensions of such uncertainty, exploring how governmental gyrations can feed through to 
the real economy. Extensions to this research by Boutchkova et al. (2012), Pastor and 
Veronesi (2013), and Brogaard and Detzel (2015) have applied the same conceptual 
framework to explore the effects of policy uncertainty on stock market volatility. These 
recent explorations have empirically demonstrated the link between political instability and 
volatility, with Boutchkova et al. (2012) noting that policy uncertainty creates a country-
specific systematic risk. Along these same lines, Pastor and Veronesi (2013) also show how 
policy uncertainty not only creates risk but has an amplified effect in countries with weak 
economic conditions, introducing an element of feedback from uncertainty to risk and back 
again.  
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While this burgeoning literature has thus far examined manifestations of policy changes 
(generally derived from news-based indices), the findings from Boutchkova et al. (2012) and 
Pastor and Veronesi (2013) suggest that other types of uncertainty beyond mere news 
announcements may be more pervasive in determining systematic levels of financial 
volatility. In particular, there is a chance that an economy may be undergoing institutional 
volatility, when policies are no longer mere adjustments to current paths but instead signal a 
re-evaluation of the building blocks of an economy. In fact, this idea of “institutional 
uncertainty” should be felt first and foremost in financial markets, which have been shown to 
be very sensitive even to news (Engle and Ng 1993); large changes in institutions should 
have correspondingly larger effects. Institutional volatility would thus be a better metric of 
systemic risk than news or discrete political changes. 
 
How would threats to and reforms of basic institutions such as the political system or 
property rights then translate into financial volatility? This paper is motivated by this research 
question, as the idea of institutional volatility and its relation to financial markets is a notable 
gap in the extant literature. A possible reason for this oversight is the reality that institutional 
volatility is rarely observed, given that institutional changes are meant to take place over a 
long period of time (as opposed to financial sector movements, which are very high-
frequency). Indeed, institutions are characterized by time-invariance and semi-permanence, a 
trait which allows them to both be plausibly assumed as exogenous over a short time-frame 
and also separated out from policies and other attributes of an economy. Institutional 
changes, when they do occur, either happen over a long period of time through very gradual 
evolution (as in the case of religious dogma) or in a sudden structural break. From an 
econometric standpoint, in the first instance, quantification of institutions would show only 
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the most minute changes (if any) over a long period, while in the second, large changes may 
be missed in highly aggregated data.   
 
The transition experience in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) are an exception to this rule, as they have not had the luxury of 
institutional stability over the past quarter-century. The change of institutions from 
communist-era to capitalist ones occurred in a compacted time frame and was observed in 
real-time, necessarily leading to several episodes of institutional change, occurring at 
different times and at different speeds. This experience affords us the opportunity to 
understand the effects of this institutional volatility, as changes in fundamental institutions 
such as democracy or the building of institutions such as property rights could have 
significantly impacted a country’s systematic risk profile. In fact, the relationship of 
institutional volatility to financial volatility could be even more pronounced in the transition 
context, as changes in financial sector institutions in transition occurred in tandem with 
broader institutional changes throughout an economy. Understanding these linkages, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the broader institutional environment could both influence 
financial sector development and influence the incidence of volatility.  
 
Given this reality, this paper focuses on the countries of CEE and FSU as a laboratory to 
examine the effects of institutional changes on financial markets. Going beyond the policy 
uncertainty concept, I make a contribution to both the institutional and financial market 
literature by empirically identifying the impact of deeper institutional changes on financial 
risk. Assembling a unique database of monthly institutional changes from 1991 to 2017, this 
paper applies the GARCH family of models to ascertain the impact of institutions on 
financial volatility in 20 transition economies. The results confirm previous research that 
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more advanced institutions, specifically democratic accountability and property rights, are 
good for financial markets. More importantly, this analysis also demonstrates that 
institutional volatility feeds through directly to financial sector volatility, with democratic 
volatility have a consistent negative impact. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the literature behind 
institutional volatility, while Section 3 describes the empirical model and identification 
strategy. Section 4 discusses the unique dataset created for the paper and diagnostics utilized, 
while Section 5 presents estimation results on the series of GARCH-family models utilized. 
Section 6 concludes with implications and future avenues for research. 
 
2. Institutions and Financial Volatility: What is the Link? 
2.1  Stock Markets and Institutions 
A voluminous literature exists in finance and economics on the determinants of stock market 
volatility, with these determinants loosely grouped into three separate areas: 
 The intrinsic or actualized attributes of stock markets that make them susceptible, 
such as systematic risk, size or capitalization (Bekaert and Harvey 1997), turnover 
(Andersen 1996), leverage (Christie 1982), and other attributes of a particular stock 
exchange (Gabaix et. al 2006);  
 Domestic and international macroeconomic factors and policies (Schwert 1989), 
including growth (Beltratti and Morana 2006), inflation (Flannery and 
Protopapadakis 2002), credit (Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche 2001), overall 
macroeconomic health (Errunza and Hogan 1998), and other business cycle factors 
exogenous to the stock exchange (Bollerslev and Zhou 2006); and   
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 Behavior and performance of other stock markets (King and Wadhwani 1990, Forbes 
and Rigobon 2002, Beirne et. al 2009, and literally hundreds of other papers), as a 
method of importing either stability or volatility exogenous to both specific stock 
exchanges and specific countries. 
 
With regard to the relationship between institutions and the financial sector, however, 
research has been conducted mainly at a higher level, focusing on overviews that answer the 
question if institutions influence financial sector development and activity. The 
overwhelming consensus is “of course,” with work such as Beck and Levine (2008) 
concluding that legal origins can account for differences in property rights regimes and thus 
the development of a country’s financial sector. Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996) 
find that countries with well-developed institutional systems tend to have large and liquid 
stock markets and Durham (2002) notes that rule of law and institutions more broadly support 
financial development. Chinn and Ito (2006) also find that general institutional quality 
indicators, such as rule of law and bureaucratic quality, support successful financial sector 
development greater than financial sector-specific institutions (such as transparency of 
accounting procedures). 
 
At a more disaggregated level, the literature has shied away from more specific 
classifications of “institutions,” preferring to examine them ad hoc rather than delineating 
institutions by their function and then tracing out how said institution would theoretically 
influence financial markets. This approach misses the variegated nature of institutions and, in 
particular, the reality that there is a distinct difference between how a political institution 
would affect financial development versus an economic one. As Hartwell (2013) notes, 
economic institutions are designed or arise to maximize the utility of principals in the 
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economic sphere, by solely influencing and mediating economic outcomes pertaining to 
distribution of resources; on the other hand, political institutions pertain to distribution of 
political power and, while they may have economic impact as a second-order effect, they are 
not explicitly designed to influence incentives. Thus, an economic institution may rely on 
political institutions (like the judiciary) but is concerned with economic matters such as 
incentives, coordination, information, or transaction costs. Conversely, political institutions 
are concentrated on the rules and procedures of political power, such as election rules, 
constraints on the executive, and parliamentary oversight, the rules of a different game than 
economic institutions. Clearly, each of these types of institutions would influence financial 
sectors differently, and would have effects both direct and indirect. 
 
To dig deeper, there are specific types of institutions under these headings which also could 
be expected to have a greater influence on financial markets. As the sine qua non of 
economic institutions, property rights have been proven empirically to be a foundation for 
transition dynamics (Hartwell 2013), economic growth (Torstensson 1994, Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2005, Asoni 2008, and many others), and, most importantly for our purposes, the 
development of an effective financial sector (Clague et al. 1999, Andrianaivo and Yartey 
2009).  
 
The reason for the association between the level of a country’s property rights and its 
financial sector development is clear: more secure property rights, in addition to providing 
the basis for greater savings (and thus lending), also allow for the use of collateral in 
financing (as well as increasing the value of that collateral, see Claessens and Laeven 2003).  
Moreover, property rights define the contractual relations in an economy, and higher levels of 
such rights mean less risk of contractual non-compliance (Clague et al. 1999). Additionally, 
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property rights create incentives for investment (Besley 1995) that would contribute to 
financial sector development, as firms seek out better financing vehicles to allow them take 
advantage of market opportunities. Claessens and Laeven (2003) provide some evidence for 
this view, finding that property rights improve asset allocation in the financial sector, which 
then in turn leads to positive effects on growth in sectoral value. Johnson et al. (2002) also 
note that secure property rights encourages firms to reinvest profits within their own country, 
providing needed capital to financial markets, while low levels of property rights increase 
retained earnings and skew financial intermediation away from capital markets and towards 
banks. 
 
Unlike the large theoretical and empirical literature on this particular economic institution 
and financial markets, there is comparatively less written on the impact of political 
institutions on the functioning of stock exchanges. Keefer (2008) provides an excellent 
overview of the extant research, noting that a consensus has been reached on the importance 
of political checks and balances for financial sector development, but also noting that 
political competition and credible commitment may dominate in terms of influencing 
financial sectors. Haber (2008) also notes that democracy may limit predatory behavior by 
elites, limiting their ability for financial repression. However, there is also evidence that 
democracy is not essential for a functioning financial sector, as Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
note that financial repression might actually be favored by democracies, sold to citizens as a 
means of consumer protection but is in reality a way to protect incumbent rents. Yang 
(2011a) provides evidence that levels of democracy also have little effect on broader financial 
sector development (also shown in Miletkov and Wintoki [2009]) and, importantly for this 
paper, no correlation with stock market development. 
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2.2 Institutions and their Volatility 
Almost all of the quantitative institutional literature noted above has focused on institutions at 
their levels or, in rare instances, annual changes, while trying to ascertain the effect of 
institutions on financial markets (of course, there is a large theoretical literature on 
institutional change, but this is rarely tested empirically). But institutions, despite their semi-
permanent nature, do change, and these changes should have effects in both financial markets 
and the real economy. Moreover, institutional change may not be linear but may be subjected 
to a series of starts and stops, creating volatility, unpredictability, and uncertainty in an 
economy and across socioeconomic relations (Gilles et al. 2015). 
 
Indeed, the research that has been done examining institutional volatility has been focused on 
the quantification of institutional instability on economic growth, rather than on financial 
sector outcomes. Brunetti and Weder (1998) focus on changes in national-level political 
institutions, including constitutional changes and probability of institutional shifts (based on 
survey data), finding that constitutional changes (i.e. political volatility) are negatively 
correlated with growth. In a similar vein, Svensson (1998) also examines political 
institutional volatility, modeling the effect of political institutions on economic ones (in this 
case, property rights). His results point to a negative effect on investment, with the 
probability of an imminent political change (derived from a probit model) harming property 
rights formation, which then in turn feeds through to investment decisions (Yang (2011b) 
also finds that normal democratic processes tend to increase macroeconomic instability). 
Berggren et al. (2011) take this examination even further to model the effects of institutional 
“instability” on growth, using coefficients of variation from a set of institutional measures 
constructed by principal components analysis (PCA) to proxy for instability over a five-year 
period. Using a GLS estimator with fixed-effects and controlling for other macroeconomic 
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influences, their results are “context dependent:” in particular, they find that instability in 
legal and policy institutions in rich countries actually contributes significantly to higher 
growth rates, while instability of social institutions is a drag on growth across all countries.  
 
 
Beyond the linkages between growth and institutional volatility, the economics research tends 
to thin out, with other disciplines only taking up the slack marginally. For example, Chung 
and Beamish (2005) examine the dynamic nature of institutions in the context of 
multinational decisions in emerging economies, finding that firms that are either wholly-
owned subsidiaries or majority-domestic joint ventures weather periods of institutional 
volatility better than mostly “foreign” firms. Other researchers have come at the issue of 
institutional volatility from either a law or political science perspective; Gallo and Alston 
(2008), for example, place the difficulties in Argentina’s banking system since 1949 as a 
function of the breakdown of judicial independence and purge of 80% of the Supreme Court 
justices in 1947. Similarly, Stern et al (2002) comes closer to the issue of financial sector 
performance and institutional volatility, but their focus is less on the impact of institutional 
volatility on the financial sector as the second-order impact on governmental crisis 
management in the Baltic countries.  
 
2.3 Institutional Volatility → Financial Volatility 
Given the large amount of evidence linking institutional quality to financial sector 
development and, in many cases, performance, it stands to reason that volatile institutional 
changes would also translate through to financial sector outcomes. But the slow-paced nature 
of institutional change (and the difficulty of quantifying it) have pushed researchers interested 
in volatility towards examining “policy uncertainty” as a determinant of financial sector 
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outcomes. A somewhat first-order solution to a second-order issue (after all, policies are the 
inputs that can shape institutions and their development, either explicitly or implicitly), the 
policy uncertainty literature has laid a theoretical groundwork for the effects of institutional 
volatility, with papers such as Rodrik (1991), Aizenman and Marion (1993), Pastor and 
Veronesi (2013), and Baker et al. (2016) focusing on the feed-through of instability to the 
real economy via expectations and investment decisions. Similarly, work from Brogaard and 
Detzel (2015) examines 21 developed and developing economies and finds that their measure 
of economic policy uncertainty depresses stock market returns and increases risk.   
 
Taking this uncertainty approach to the next level means consolidating the previous literature 
to understand that uncertainty regarding specific institutions (i.e. property rights and 
democracy) will translate directly into financial volatility. From an information perspective, 
news and policies may convey information regarding the future path of institutional 
development, but legislative changes and institutional reforms are likely to have a much 
larger effect than mere news. Indeed, in the transition context, news and policy shifts actually 
may have an enormous impact on institutional development, which then would send signals 
to the markets regarding the state of property rights or democracy in a country. 
 
As an example, volatility of property rights can affect financial volatility over time through 
many channels. At an aggregate level, Angelopoulos et al. (2011) show how property rights 
in Mexico had a direct influence on the evolution of macroeconomic stability in a country, 
noting that this in turn influenced financial volatility. With stable property rights engendering 
higher levels of macroeconomic stability on average, a country should then also see 
dampened volatility in its financial markets. But in relation to the information channel, 
French and Roll (1986), DeLong et al. (1990) and Morck et al. (2000) focus on the effects 
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that secure property rights have on facilitating information for risk arbitrage. Morck et al. 
(2000:216) note that “inadequate protection for property rights could make informed risk 
arbitrage in their stock markets unattractive” as arbitrageurs are unable to keep the fruits of 
their arbitrage labor, thus depriving the market of informed traders and creating far too much 
noise. In such an environment, information scarcity can exacerbate volatility, making markets 
even more susceptible to rumors, political changes, or other news that might have been 
appropriately hedged with better property rights (De Long et al. 1990). However, where 
property rights are secure, information regarding firm-specific risk is valued accordingly, 
meaning that every bit of bad news or financial shock need not necessarily lead to panic nor 
should spillover effects of firm-specific financial failures be magnified throughout the 
market. In this sense, property rights perform an analogous function in financial markets to 
Baumol’s (1990) assertion that property rights enable entrepreneurs to survive technology 
shocks, acting as an information buffer against exogenous financial shocks.   
 
Similar to the information argument is a question of credible commitment. If we define 
property rights as a hedge against government expropriation (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), 
an environment of stronger and more stable rights means less of a chance of a catastrophic 
financial outcome in the economy caused by government (e.g. nationalization), that would in 
turn induce elevated levels of volatility. Where property rights are continually being 
redefined, as in the early stages of a transition economy or during momentous political 
changes, financial markets are less likely to see these rights as a credible and valid protection 
against government depredation. With worries about political interference in markets 
amplified by a lack of established property rights, financial markets may then overshoot 
beyond fundamentals or continue to see heightened levels of volatility for longer periods of 
time than in a secure property rights environment.  
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On the other hand, there are also theoretically plausible scenarios where property rights can 
correlate with high volatility. A key tenet of ownership is the right to dispose of assets as one 
sees fit. Given that property rights make ownership easier, in an atmosphere of financial 
uncertainty or exogenous financial socks, it stands to reason that property rights may actually 
act as a lubricant for volatility; firms or investors would then be able to unload their assets 
more quickly than in an environment where exchange is more difficult. Thus, the security of 
property rights may actually contribute to an increase in turnover, which may magnify 
volatility. In addition, building on the Morck et al. (2000) thesis noted above, secure property 
rights may create more informed traders and capitalize information more easily into stock 
prices. But in an environment where other supporting institutions are absent, such as sound 
monetary institutions or executive constraints, knowledge may actually play a role in 
exacerbating volatility. In an environment where bad news abounds, informed traders could 
act as a signaling device to the rest of the market, creating volatility where before was an 
(unstable and sub-optimal) equilibrium. In the case of a country with no good news to trade 
on, ignorance might be bliss.   
 
While we noted above that political institutions and their lack of correspondence to financial 
sector development, there is a voluminous literature related to political volatility and financial 
volatility, albeit related to political events and not political institutions. For example, work 
from Bialkowski et al. (2008) and Boutchkova et al. (2012) examines elections and their 
financial impact, concluding that the variance of returns from a country’s major index 
doubles during an election week. Hartwell (2017) also looks at the effects of various types of 
political instability on financial markets in transition, finding that elections have a significant 
role to play in creating volatility. However, the idea that sustained or unexpected institutional 
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volatility (after all, elections are planned months, if not centuries, in advance), can have 
immediate effects on financial performance throughout the economy has remained relatively 
unexplored. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Identification Strategy  
The empirical strategy for this paper seeks to link together the various strands of literature 
noted in the previous section, modelling the effects of two specific types of institutional 
volatility on financial sector outcomes. The basic model for this examination is: 
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑡  =    𝜇𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
Where: 
(2) 𝜇𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝛾𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝜌𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
And 
(3) 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝜎𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑖𝑡 
 
This model relates financial market outcomes (Y) to institutions (INST), macroeconomic 
conditions (MACRO), an n-order autoregressive process, and idiosyncratic processes related 
to financial market volatility (𝜀, more on this below). 
 
The Y variable in Equation 1 will be proxied by two separate measures. The first, standard in 
the literature (starting with Merton (1980) and Perry (1982)), is stock market returns, 
expressed as the log difference of the returns in the stock market index of country i between 
day t and day t-1: 
(4) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =   (∑ [log(𝑝𝑡) − log(𝑝𝑡−1)]
𝑁𝑡
𝑡=1 ∗ 100) 
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This metric, used inter alia by Baillie and Degennaro (1990), Chiang and Doong (2001), and 
Nikkinen et al. (2008), is aggregated monthly so as to comport with the highest-frequency 
institutional data available (see below). This indicator as a measure of financial market health 
has the benefit of long histories in the transition economies (in some cases, such as the Czech 
Republic, 285 separate monthly observations are available) but is unfortunately not available 
for all of the countries of Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (a complete 
description of all data sources is shown in the Data Appendix, Table A.1).  
 
From this return data, a volatility series can be generated utilizing standard financial 
econometric measures, to understand the relationship between volatilities. The estimator of 
choice for the volatility modeling is the autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (ARCH) 
family of models, which have been utilized to investigate the effects of financial volatility in 
a large and well-established literature (Engle 1982, Hayo and Kutan 2005, and Wu and Shea 
2011 are but a few examples). ARCH models have positives that recommend them to the 
application of institutional changes, especially in the context of transition economies. In 
particular, institutional shocks can display a high degree of persistence (if not an outright 
structural break) and have periods of large and volatile movements, followed by periods of 
“normalcy,” only to be followed again by high volatility.1  
 
Despite these positive attributes, ARCH modelling for institutional changes is relatively rare. 
Asteriou and Price (2001), Henisz (2004), Jayasuriya (2005), Klomp and De Haan (2009), 
                                                          
1
 While GMM estimators are equipped to handle conditional heteroskedasticity, as Fleming (1998) notes, time-
series volatility data have a high degree of serial correlation that may generate spurious results in a GMM 
framework. In this data especially (and as noted below), there is high persistence of volatility, meaning longer 
lags of variables would be needed as valid instruments; as Tauchen (1986: 397) notes, however, the bias of 
GMM rises as more instruments based on deeper lags of variables are introduced, leading to estimates 
concentrating “around biased values [while] confidence intervals become misleading.” Finally, diagnostic tests 
using a “system-GMM” approach with this sizeable dataset inevitably resulted in an over-proliferation of 
instruments even after collapsing instruments and restricting lags, a problem that Roodman (2009) notes leads 
to imprecise estimates of the weighting matrix. 
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and the immediate predecessors of this current paper, Campos and Karanasos (2008) and 
Campos, Karanasos, and Tan (2012), are the notable exceptions (see Table 1 for a summary 
of these papers). For our purposes, theoretically, institutional shocks in transition should 
exhibit asymmetric effects that would not be captured in a simple GARCH specification, with 
negative institutional shocks having a greater (negative) effect on financial volatility than 
positive shocks of the same magnitude would (Malik 2011). Indeed, it can be theorized that 
institutional volatility would have a similar effect to bad news, with “bad” institutional 
changes having much “worse” effects on volatility (Engle and Ng 1993), but in a much more 
persistent and deeper manner than mere bad news. This reality would recommend either the 
exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) model of 
Nelson (1991), the GJR-GARCH model of Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), or, as in 
Campos and Karanasos (2008), one of the power-ARCH (PARCH or APARCH) models as 
the preferred approach. Each of these models defines (if slightly differently) the 𝜖 term shown 
in Equations 1 and 3 to introduce the leverage effects in the conditional variance. For 
example, the APARCH model frames volatility in the conditional variance as: 
(5) 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝛿𝑖 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1 (|𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗| − 𝛾𝑖,𝑗𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
𝛿
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝜎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
𝛿𝑖𝑝
𝑘=1 +  𝜂𝜒′𝑖𝑡    
Where 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 is a leverage term which captures any asymmetric effects of shocks to the system, 
the first summation is the lag of the residuals of power δ from the mean equation (the ARCH 
term, weighted by the coefficient 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 and with the restriction that α ≥ 0) and the second 
summation is the previous period’s forecast variance (the GARCH term, weighted by 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 and 
also restricted at β ≥ 0). As Ding et al. (1993) prove and as Laurent (2004) notes, this model 
nests up to seven variations of the GARCH models within it depending upon the δ term (e.g., 
a standard GARCH model has δ = 0 and 𝛾 = 0).   
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In a different vein, the EGARCH approach models volatility via a logarithmic transformation, 
making it a more flexible model than GJR-GARCH (in that it requires no constraints to keep 
the volatility effect non-negative) but otherwise is similar to the APARCH model in that it 
models volatility as a function of previous period (log squared) variance forecasts (the 
GARCH term) and previous innovations (the ARCH term).
2
 If we rearrange equation 3 so 
that 
(6) 𝑧𝑖𝑡 =  𝜀𝑖𝑡𝜎𝑖𝑡
−1 
 
We can express the EGARCH model as: 
(7) ln(σ𝑖,𝑡
2 )  =  𝜔0 +  ∑ 𝜁𝑖 log (𝜎𝑖,𝑡−𝑖)
2
+  𝜌𝑖,𝑗(∑ [|𝑧𝑖,𝑡−𝑗| + 𝐸|𝑧𝑖,𝑡−𝑗|] +  𝛾𝑧𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
𝑞
𝑗=𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1  
+ 𝜂𝜒′𝑖,𝑡    
 
To each of these standard equations can be added additional variables, in our case, metrics to 
capture the volatility of institutions; shown as the vector of institutional changes 𝜒′𝑖𝑡   in 
Equations 5 and 7, this vector includes both the level measurement of the institutional 
variable (property rights and democracy) and the volatility measurement of the institutional 
variable as part of the conditional variance of returns. Based on the idiosyncrasies of this 
particular data and given the similarity in their treatment of volatility shocks, post-estimation 
statistics such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) will be used to determine which approach models the conditional volatility 
more effectively. 
 
The approach taken here will also deviate from earlier studies by using a panel-GARCH 
model in the vein of Cermeno and Grier (2006), who note, “to study the determinants and real 
effects of uncertainty in the developing world, we need a panel GARCH model.” Panel-
                                                          
2
 As can be seen in Equation 7, the EGARCH model deviates from the APARCH family as it measures conditional 
variance as an explicit multiplicative function of lagged innovations. 
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GARCH has the merit of augmenting the relative paucity of observations per country but also 
capturing the heightened effects that are anticipated in an emerging or transition framework; 
as Lee (2010:143) notes, “panel GARCH models entail potential efficiency gains in 
estimating the conditional variance and covariance processes by incorporating relevant 
information about heterogeneity across economies as well as their interdependence.” The 
panel utilized here is a pooled set of countries facing independent innovations; diagnostic 
testing using country fixed-effects dummies found no appreciable difference in significance 
but instead just made convergence more difficult.  
 
As a check on the volatility measure derived from absolute returns, an additional measure of 
financial volatility will also be utilized for robustness tests. Realized volatility, an 
increasingly-popular but long-pedigreed measure of financial instability, will also be included 
to verify the results obtained from modeling of returns. For this examination, and as in 
Christensen and Prabhala (1998), Andersen et al. (2003), Ludvigson and Ng (2007), and 
Beine et al. (2010), realized volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the daily index 
return: 
(8) 𝜎2 =  ∑ (𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1 )
2 
Where r, daily returns (defined as log(pt/pt-1)) is demeaned, squared, and then summed over 
the month for each country. For estimation purposes, this metric has different properties from 
absolute returns, and diagnostics revealed it follows a heteroskedastic, AR(1) process. As this 
indicator allows for “normal” panel data econometric testing without deriving a volatility 
process, I follow the approach of Hartwell (2014) and fashion a fixed-effects model with 
realized volatility on the left-hand side and the same institutional and control variables as 
shown in prior equation on the right-hand side. Standard OLS estimation is used for this 
specification but with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors to allow for controlling country-
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level effects (and time-invariant characteristics), in addition to correcting for 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and contemporaneous spatial correlation across countries.  
Moreover, this approach is suitable given the properties of Driscoll-Kraay errors, which 
requires a long time-series, as the high-frequency nature of this data means that every country 
has well over the “safe” limit of T=50 required for Driscoll-Kraay estimation. Finally, the use 
of fixed-effects in a Driscoll-Kraay pooled specification has the added bonus of requiring 
only weak exogeneity of the regressors, which is likely to be the case here (Vogelsang 2012). 
 
3.2 Measuring Institutional Volatility 
As noted above, the two institutions to be tested in the empirical specification are property 
rights and democracy. Two separate indicators will be utilized to test the effects of property 
rights on volatility, each with its own advantages and drawbacks. The first indicator will 
measure potential property rights, encompassing legislation regarding various facets of 
property rights (on the theory that, if the law were followed to its letter and its spirit, property 
rights would attain a maximum amount of protection available under the particular law). For 
the econometric examination below, the metric used to capture these potential rights is the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measure “investment profile,” which covers 
contract viability and threat of expropriation. There has been extensive use of this metric in 
the literature as a proxy for property rights, including Knack and Keefer (1995), Knack 
(1996), and Svensson (1998), and more recently in a financial sector context by Durnev et al. 
(2009), Ali et al. (2010), Dutta and Roy (2011), and Lin et al. (2012).  With good coverage 
back to pre-transition for many countries, the ICRG investor protection indicator has an 
added advantage of use in other studies as a broad proxy for institutional quality more 
generally (see, for example Busse and Hefeker 2007 or Catrinescu et. al 2009).  
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However, the ICRG indicator is, according to the PRS group, “made on the basis of 
subjective analysis of the available information” on a country, and as such relies heavily on 
legislation and other input indicators (Voigt 2013). The second indicator for property rights 
thus recognizes the reality that legislative frameworks in countries in flux, such as in 
transition economies, rarely encompass the reality of property rights and administration often 
diverges from legislation. This measure, one of realized property rights, is “contract intensive 
money” (CIM), an indicator used by inter alia Clague et. al (1996, 1999), Dollar and Kraay 
(2003), Compton and Giedeman (2011), and Hartwell (2013). CIM measures the proportion 
of money held outside the formal banking sector as a proportion of all money: 
(9) 
(𝑀2−𝐶)
𝑀2
 
Where M2 is a measure of broad money and C is the amount of money held outside formal 
deposit institutions. Under the concept of contract-intensive money, greater property rights 
would manifest itself as larger amounts of money held inside the formal banking sector. 
While this objective indicator may capture more than pure property rights protection,
3
 the use 
of contract-intensive money not only avoids some of the critiques of a subjective measure 
such as that leveled by Voigt (2013); as Clague et. al 1996 demonstrate, variation in the CIM 
indicator across countries mirrors actual changes in institutions and policies, and thus is 
empirically more reliable than subjectively derived data on property rights enforcement (see 
Figure 1 for the path of contract intensive money in each country).    
 
                                                          
3
 It has been suggested (see Brown, Carmignani, and Fayad 2013) that contract-intensive money may be a 
better indicator for financial depth rather than property rights. However, I disagree with this assertion due to 
the frequency of the data – in a transition economy, property rights may be in a state of flux, with various 
initiatives changing the overall perception of rights protection in a short period of time. In contrast, financial 
depth is a slower-moving creature that may change radically as new legislation or instruments are introduced, 
but in general doesn’t exhibit the same volatile shifts that basic institutions in flux would. Thus, saying that 
financial depth changes from month to month and can be captured by this indicator is a much bigger reach 
than noticing the reaction of the populace to changes that can directly affect their property. 
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Given that property rights are a measure of a key economic institution, inclusion of a measure 
of political institutions will also shed light on the institutional determinants of volatility and 
how political institutions interact with economic ones. For this, I use the ICRG indicator for 
“democratic accountability” as a proxy for political institutions and how they may influence 
financial volatility (following Campos and Karanasos (2008)). The inclusion of democracy is 
of course an imperfect catch-all for political institutions, especially given that it is 
theoretically unclear why democracy would lead to better (worse) outcomes with financial 
volatility; moreover, previous work in growth economics has shown a negative effect of 
democracy (Hartwell 2013).
4
 However, given the paucity of monthly political institutional 
data, this remains one of the best proxies available for ascertaining the state of a country’s 
political institutions and their effect on financial markets (Akitoby and Stratmann 2010). 
 
These measures of both economic and political institutions will enter the mean equation at 
their levels at a lag, in order to avoid simultaneity issues (see Equation 2). However, as the 
real purpose of this current examination is to understand institutional volatility, volatility 
metrics based on the institutional variables just noted will also be also constructed.  
Following an approach used by Berggren et al. (2011), I use a 6-month rolling standard 
deviations of each institutional variable. Constructed via Stata’s “rollstat” routine, this 
method results in a variable at the end of the window which encompasses the standard 
deviation of the institutional metric for that country over the previous three to six months 
(creating a “realized volatility” metric for institutions). With a moving window across each 
panel (and, in many instances, more coverage of institutional measures than stock market 
ones), this calculation preserves a full data series of institutional volatility.     
                                                          
4
 This also enters under the heading of “agenda for future research,” as there may be better monthly metrics 
to measure political institutions. Other metrics that have been utilized in other papers, however, such as the 
ICRG’s measure of the military in politics (used by Miletkov and Wintoki 2017) are unsuitable for the set of 
transition economies examined in this paper. The search continues. 
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3.3 Controls 
As explanators for other variables that may be influencing financial volatility, the MACRO 
vector shown in Equation 2 above includes a set of macroeconomic variables drawn from the 
long literature relating macroeconomics to financial volatility (see especially the 
comprehensive examinations of Garcia and Liu (1999) and Christiansen et al. (2012)). A 
complete description of all variables is shown in Table 1. 
 
 Inflation is included, as in Christiansen et al. (2012), acting as a proxy for general 
macroeconomic policy instability. Inflation has also been shown to negatively impact 
financial sector performance (Boyd, Levine, and Smith 2001), as well as being 
correlated (Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), Engle and Rangel (2008), and Corradi, 
Distaso, and Mele (2013)) with greater financial volatility. To account for 
hyperinflationary episodes, the inflationary variable is transformed as in Staehr (2005) 
as log (inflation rate year-on-year+100). 
 Economic Growth is a proxy for the overall macroeconomic health of an economy. As 
Engle and Rangel (2008: 1209) note, “countries experiencing low or negative 
economic growth observe larger expected volatilities than countries with superior 
economic growth.” As used in Engle, Ghysels, and Sohn (2013) and scores of other 
papers, economic activity is proxied here by the percentage change in industrial 
production indices month-to-month.
5
 
                                                          
5
 A major caveat regarding industrial production should be considered, as transition economies, where the 
move is away from Soviet-style heavy industry, should necessarily see a slowing of industrial production 
(perhaps permanent) as the economy reorients itself. For the purposes of this dataset, however, the creation 
of financial exchanges occurred generally after the bulk of the transformational recession was completed, 
meaning that industrial production can be safely included. 
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 Exchange rates: As noted in Hsing and Hsieh (2012) in the transition context, the net 
impact of exchange rate appreciation is unclear, but their empirical results showed a 
consistent negative relationship between exchange rate changes and stock market 
returns in Poland. As in Ludvigson and Ng (2007), here we use monthly change in the 
real effective exchange rate.  
 EU Accession: Finally, transition economies are in reality a heterogeneous group. 
Indeed, of the group of economies examined here, exactly half (ten) implemented 
reforms that qualified for accession to the European Union. Given that these countries 
based their legal and regulatory reforms on the European model, EU accession could 
have created an exogenously-determined improvement in institutional quality and 
stability that would be different from those countries not seeking EU accession. For 
the purposes of this examination, a dummy was created that took the value of 0 for 
each month that a country was not in the EU and a value of 1 from the moment it 
acceded and every month thereafter. As a control, an alternate dummy was used, 
taking the value of 1 for every period if the country ever joined the EU (i.e. Bulgaria 
would be coded as a 1 in 1998 even though it did not join the EU until 2008), to 
capture institutional convergence effects.
6
 
 
Each of these indicators will be included in the empirical analysis at their levels in the 
conditional mean to show effects on stock market returns. As with the institutional variables, 
volatility metrics constructed of 6-month rolling standard deviations are used in the 
conditional variance equation, to match macroeconomic volatility with financial volatility.  
 
                                                          
6
 Additional permutations of this dummy were attempted in diagnostic regressions, including a dummy if EU 
access was one year away, two years away, etc. None of these dummy variables proved significant and thus 
are not included here. 
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3.4 Data 
Given the smaller sub-set of transition countries that have functioning stock exchanges, this 
restricts the data somewhat to 20 countries over various time periods starting from 1989 and 
ending in May 2017: Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, (Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia 
(FYROM), Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia (and Montenegro, until 2005), 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The countries included are a healthy mix of EU accession 
and non-EU accession states (split evenly down the middle), as well as a collection of large 
and small economies and states at various stages of development. These countries are also 
characterized by differing sizes of their capital markets, with some striking differences; for 
example, the value of all shares traded on the Tallinn Stock Exchange in 2004 was only 5% 
of that traded in Prague.
7
 In other countries, the number of listed domestic companies are 
much smaller than in others, but not necessarily in the way one would expect. Indeed, 
countries very open to foreign investment such as the Czech Republic have far fewer 
domestic firms listed than countries such as Croatia (15 versus 185 in 2015, according to the 
World Bank).  
 
Given this diversity of capital markets, a plausible argument can be made that less-important 
stock exchanges would have less of an effect on overall financial volatility or a country’s risk 
profile. However, while the stock exchanges examined here may have differing levels of 
importance to their national economies, that does not vitiate the thesis of this paper, namely 
that institutional changes may harm ways in which the financial sector examines risk. In fact, 
for countries which have thinner capital markets (say, a Kyrgyz Republic or a FYROM), 
institutional changes should be more pronounced, as the lack of liquidity and arbitrage 
                                                          
7
 Based on World Federation of Exchanges data. 
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opportunities will make them highly susceptible to institutional changes. Such an effect 
would be even more pronounced in countries where the state has a much larger role in the 
economy (e.g. Belarus), and, given that these economies would also have greater sensitivity 
to institutional changes originating from the top, the financial sector could represent the 
canary in the coal mine for an economy risk profile. Put another way, small capital markets 
may not capture the total economic effect of changes in a country’s risk due to institutional 
volatility, but they are even more likely to be affected by institutional change. Thus, retaining 
stock market changes as a measure of financial volatility is quite appropriate to tease out 
these institutional effects. 
 
The institutional and macroeconomic data for these countries came from a large variety of 
sources, including from Bloomberg and CEIC for stock market returns; M2, currency outside 
depository corporations, and some industrial production variables from either the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) or from the central banks of each transition economy 
(often obtained via arduous excel manipulation) or central statistical bureaus (also often 
obtained on paper and entered in manually); interest rate data from Eurostat, the European 
Central Bank, and country national banks; exchange rate data from Darvas (2012); and 
property rights and democracy data from ICRG, as noted above.  
 
Diagnostics on the dataset (Table 2) also confirm the presence of significant conditional 
heteroskedasticity across variables, especially seen in the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of 
Engle (1982) for ARCH effects. Moreover, the high levels of leptokurtosis in the institutional 
data points strongly towards use of a model incorporating either a Student t distribution or 
Generalized Error Distribution (GED), as opposed to a Gaussian (normal) one, in order to 
capture the “fat tails” of the institutional variables (Bollerslev 1987, Nelson 1991, and 
25 
 
Bollerslev, Engle, and Nelson 1994). Finally, examination of the autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation functions of the returns and volatility variables show the persistence of the 
dependence over time; in particular, the returns data shows extensive persistence through the 
first lag, meaning an AR(1) model is most appropriate (as shown in Equation 2, as 
diagnostics regarding model using at various AR(p) lags also showed that AIC and Schwarz 
Bayesian Information (SBIC) criterion were minimized with an AR(1) model).   
 
 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1 GARCH Results 
The results of the effect of both institutional levels and institutional volatility on financial 
volatility are shown in Tables 3 and 4. While the GARCH family of models are powerful in 
terms of their versatility in modeling volatility, they are fragile in terms of convergence due 
to the gradient-like algorithm used to solve the log-likelihood maximization, especially in the 
presence of many (and changing) covariates (Zumbach 2000). For this reason, as the set of 
controls change, the preferred model (in terms of AIC/BIC minimization and simple 
convergence ability) from the alphabet soup of ARCH models may change. As noted above, 
however, models utilizing a leverage term were consistently favored, including the EGARCH 
model of Nelson (1991), the Power-GARCH model of Higgins and Bera (1992), the 
Asymmetric Power-GARCH model of Ding et al. (1993), the Nonlinear Asymmetric Power-
GARCH of Bollerslev et al. (1994), or the Threshold GARCH model of Zakoian (1994).   
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The baseline regressions shown in Table 3 examine the effect of medium-term (6-month) 
institutional volatility on financial returns and volatility. As noted above, in each regression, 
the macroeconomic controls were also retained in the conditional variance as a volatility 
metric (the same as the institutional variables, as a 6-month rolling standard deviation), but 
are not shown for space considerations. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 utilize contract-intensive 
money as a proxy for property rights in the conditional mean and variance, while Columns 2 
and 4 use the ICRG investor protection measure; the difference between the first two 
regressions and the last two regressions is a shift in the measure of EU membership, from the 
dummy marked at the time of membership and afterwards to the time in which an EU 
Association Agreement was in effect but EU Accession had not occurred.  
 
The results from this examination are consistent across all specifications, with legislated 
property rights being positively correlated with stock returns in transition while democracy is 
bad for the stock market. There is a split difference on realized property rights (contract-
intensive money), shown as highly important and positive for returns when the EU Accession 
dummy is used but insignificant when the Association Agreement dummy is included. 
Perhaps more importantly, an examination of the conditional variance equations tells an 
interesting tale, as legislated property rights also contribute significantly to more volatility, in 
line with the theoretical supposition noted above. Somewhat surprisingly, the variance of 
property rights (for either proxy) is statistically insignificant over a 6-month window. By 
contrast, democracy at its level dampens volatility in 3 of the 4 specifications, but the 
volatility of democracy unequivocally and significantly correlates with much higher levels of 
financial volatility. A plausible explanation here is perhaps that markets sense that property 
rights can only be defended successfully from a democratic regime, and thus the political 
system in transition is more important than such rights for ensuring stability. 
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Another explanation for these results is one of measurement error regarding property rights 
changes, in that perhaps what matters most over longer time horizons is not the magnitude of 
institutional changes, but the persistence of institutional change. To test this proposition, 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 use a slightly different indicator of institutional volatility, 
constructing a sum of squares of changes in realized property markets over a longer period 
(12 months). The results, with two specifications to show the two different EU dummies (and 
using an asymmetric non-linear power-GARCH as in Bollerslev et al. [1994]), confirm the 
earlier regressions on the role of democracy. More importantly, however, the results also 
show that persistent and cumulative property rights volatility over a 12-month rolling window 
can indeed create significantly more financial volatility. In fact, the effect of the 12-month 
volatility of realized property rights dwarfs any other effect economically (while being 
significant at the 5% level when paired with the EU Association Agreement dummy).  
 
4.2 Robustness and Sensitivity Tests 
The baseline regressions show the effect of democracy on financial volatility in transition to 
be much larger than volatility of property rights. However, if change continues to occur and 
build cumulatively in the application of property rights, it too can have a deleterious effect on 
stock market stability. This section tests if these results hold in the face of a battery of 
different internal and external controls. 
 
A crucial issue which may influence financial markets in transition is not only domestic 
conditions but global economic trends; indeed, the time frame covered in this paper spans 
several periods of global recession and crisis, and it is plausible that the relation between 
market volatility and institutions could be driven by global conditions and not necessarily 
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institutional change (Beirne et. al 2009 noted that nearly half of all domestic stock market 
volatility in emerging markets can be explained by spillovers). The first robustness test is 
thus an inclusion of a dummy for the global financial crisis, coded as 1 from every month 
between July 2007 and June 2009 and zero otherwise, following the dating of the crisis from 
the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank as used in Leiss et al. (2015). Shown in Columns 1 and 2 
of Table 4, the global financial crisis dummy is highly significant in reducing returns and 
increasing volatility; at the same time, however, democratic volatility continues to also 
heighten volatility along with levels of legislated property rights.
8
 As in the earlier 
regressions, the value of realized property rights has little effect on volatility. 
 
Beyond the major financial cataclysm of the financial crisis, perhaps it was more the daily 
give and take of global markets which exert a great influence on transition markets. In order 
to account for this possibility within the transition space (and to avoid a possibly enormous 
omitted variable), I further include two variables to proxy for “normal” global volatility: first, 
the price of gold as a metric of world financial instability more generally, included at its 
levels in the conditional mean equation and its volatility month-on-month in the conditional 
variance equation; and secondly, the US S&P 500 index, as a check for US market volatility, 
included at its levels in the mean equation and its volatility in the conditional variance 
equations.
9
  
 
The results of this inclusion are shown in Table 4, Columns 3 through 6, and the use of either 
proxy enters as highly significant (economically and econometrically) for determining returns 
in transition economies, while only S&P volatility correlates with financial volatility. With 
                                                          
8
 The model including EU Accession was retained for the robustness tests, given its slightly better performance 
in the baseline regressions. Results for the EU Association Agreement, not reported here but available from 
the author, also did not change the baseline results. 
9
 The volatility for both gold and the S&P index was calculated as a realized volatility and done in the manner 
of Equation 7 above. 
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the inclusion of these global indices, both realized and legislated property rights are a 
significant and positive contributor to stock market returns in transition, while democracy 
continues to dampen returns on average in three out of four specifications (Columns 3, 4, and 
5). With regard to volatility, democratic volatility continues to correlate with significantly 
higher volatility, even as the S&P volatility has the dominant effect in determining home-
market volatility. Indeed, the inclusion of these global drivers of volatility improves the 
models overall (as measured by log-likelihood and information criteria), and should be taken 
as excellent proof (if not definitive) of the impact of institutions on financial volatility. 
 
As a final robustness test, and a way to overcome the possible sensitivity of GARCH models, 
realized volatility is also included to tease out institutional volatility effects. Becoming 
standard in the literature, the use of realized volatility (RV) as a dependent variable has the 
advantage of being an unbiased estimator, and as Andersen et al. (2003) show, in some 
specifications may perform better than GARCH-modeled volatility. Using a fixed-effects 
Driscoll-Kraay estimation, Table 5 shows what is basically a different modelling approach to 
the conditional variance equations from Tables 3 and 4. Using the final model from Table 4, 
including S&P volatility, the results appear to place stronger significance on property rights 
volatility than the corresponding GARCH modeling shown above, while confirming the role 
of democratic volatility. Realized property rights at its level appears to ensure marginally less 
realized volatility, but volatility of such rights, as measured by contract-intensive money, 
over a 6-month window also correlate with greater volatility. When considering legislated 
rights, there is a more statistically significant but smaller economic effect dampening 
volatility, but the effect of democratic volatility is stronger. Taking into account global 
trends, the EU factor, and macroeconomic variables, this additional test shows that 
institutional volatility continues to influence trends in financial markets in transition. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper has explored several related questions regarding institutional change and financial 
volatility, using novel methods, indicators, and high-frequency data. The results have 
mirrored earlier research, which found that better institutions in transition economies 
supplemented financial sector development. However, going beyond previous research, this 
study broke new ground in examining the effects of institutional volatility on financial 
volatility using GARCH and standard econometric modeling. The application of this 
modeling to institutional change showed that institutional effects manifest themselves quite 
strongly on financial markets, albeit in different manners. In particular, it was shown that 
democratic volatility led to high levels of financial volatility over the medium-term, while 
property rights volatility had a somewhat more muted effect, dependent upon which aspect of 
property rights was being examined. Indeed, the divergence between realized and legislated 
property rights shows the difficulty in quantifying institutions, but are provided to give a 
more holistic view of which facet of property rights affects financial volatility and in what 
manner. And somewhat surprisingly, property rights themselves appeared to contribute to 
volatility, an effect which could be considered salutary, as new market participants entered 
for the first time. But on the whole, better and more stable institutions appeared to make 
financial stability more likely.  
 
The extensions to this work are legion, including the application of GARCH-MIDAS models, 
given the differential frequency of data and also of speed of movement of indicators. 
Moreover, this work has only concentrated on two windows of institutional and 
macroeconomic volatility; the permutations of time-frames and their combinations is endless.  
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Also, as noted earlier, a logical extension to this work is expanding the set of controls for the 
models contained in this paper, with the first step exploring high-frequency indicators to 
proxy for financial liberalization as a control for institutional and policy effects. Continued 
research into the quantification of institutions, especially objective indicators for both 
economic and political institutions at a high frequency, will also contribute to our knowledge 
of the effects of institutional volatility on financial markets; perhaps an approach similar to 
the work done by Hayo and Kutan (2005) is called for, proxying political volatility by its 
appearance in the media rather than as a direct measurement.  
 
Last but not least, of course, this paper has only focused on transition economies, due to the 
idiosyncratic nature of institutional change in these countries. A welcome addition to the 
literature would be an expansion of this analysis to other (including developed) countries 
undergoing institutional changes, to assess the impact of institutional volatility on these 
economies. In one sense, all economies are “transition” economies, as their institutions and 
policies are changing, and expansion of this current work to OECD and emerging market 
economies would take this reality into account. 
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Figure 1 – Contract-Intensive Money in Transition, 1990-2016 
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Table 1 – Recent Research in GARCH Modelling and Institutions 
Author(s) Method Results 
Asteriou and Price (2001) 
GARCH and GARCH in means 
(GARCH-M)  
Constructing a principal component measure of political instability from 
various indicators including strikes and terrorism, they find that political 
instability has a highly negative, significant, and persistent effect on GDP 
growth in the UK.  
Henisz (2004) GARCH 
Henisz uses a GARCH(1,1) model to construct volatilities of nine separate 
fiscal policy indicators on a panel of 172 countries over 18 years. The policy 
volatility measure is then used as the dependent variable in a number of 
regressions to ascertain the effects of political institutions on policy volatility.  
Jayasuriya (2005) EGARCH and TGARCH 
Jayasuriya uses asymmetric modelling to examine the relationship between 
stock market volatility and institutional quality in 18 emerging markets, in 
particular investor protection and rule of law. She finds that quality of 
institutions (levels) correspond with lower volatility after financial 
liberalization. 
Campos and Karanasos (2008) and 
Campos, Karanasos, and Tan (2012) 
Power-ARCH (PARCH)  
They find that both formal (government changes) and informal (assassinations) 
political volatility affected growth in Argentina over 1896-2000, with informal 
volatility having a greater short-run and direct effect.  
Klomp and de Haan (2009) GARCH 
Klomp and De Haan utilize GARCH(1,1) modeling in order to isolate their 
political uncertainty variables, but otherwise include these variables in a 
standard GMM and mean group series of panel data estimations. 
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
n Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis LM-Statistic 
Volatility (Dependent) Variables 
Log Returns 4350 0.04 7.25 -3.07*** 944.94*** 275.03*** 
Realized Volatility 4239 0.066 0.136 32.44*** 1458.2*** 0.262 
Institutional Variables 
Property Rights (CIM) 4282 0.788 0.11 -1.35*** 2.24*** 18807.00*** 
CIM Volatility (3 months) 4152 0.005 0.006 3.39*** 20.68*** 258.50*** 
CIM Volatility (6 months) 4092 0.007 0.007 2.78*** 11.72*** 1829.70*** 
Cumulative CIM Volatility (12 months) 4032 0.006 0.039 -1.34*** 18.27*** 1056.20*** 
Property Rights (Investor Protection) 4522 8.266 2.293 -0. 419*** -0.60*** 19098.00*** 
Investor Protection Volatility (3 months) 4437 0.070 0.246 5.037*** 39.122*** 324.45*** 
Investor Protection Volatility (6 months) 4488 0.145 0.31 3.251*** 18.145*** 2714.90*** 
Democratic Accountability 4522 4.559 1.49 -1.09*** -0.06 23328.00*** 
Democratic Volatility (3 months) 4486 0.02 0.12 7.68*** 76.46*** 287.28*** 
Democratic Volatility (6 months) 4435 0.04 0.16 4.95*** 30.30*** 2656.30*** 
Global controls 
S&P returns 5010 0.0002 0.002 -0.8378*** 1.5843*** 73.479*** 
S&P volatility 5010 0.0029 0.005 6.465*** 54.528*** 202.45*** 
Gold price 5010 789.02 473.13 0.465*** -1.223*** 23968.00*** 
Gold volatility (3 months) 4971 22.46 20.77 1.45*** 2.601*** 442.21*** 
Gold volatility (6 months) 5010 32.42 27.61 1.235*** 1.39*** 1293.20*** 
Macroeconomic Variables 
Industrial Production, period change 4462 0.002 0.09 0.432 15.912***   
M2, annual change 4385 0.193 0.319 7.688*** 107.86***   
Real effective exchange rate 4862 89.83 17.431 -0.47 4.99   
Inflation, year on year 5010 2.055 0.124 5.22*** 36.29***   
EU accession dummy (all inclusive) 5010 0.62 0.485 -0.498 1.25   
EU accession dummy (year of joining) 5010 0.31 0.46 0.822 1.68   
 Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level.   
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Table 3 – GARCH Regressions of Stock Market Returns vs. 6-month Institutional Volatility  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
AR(3)-
APGARCH(1,1) 
AR(1)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
AR(1)-
PGARCH(2,2) 
AR(3)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
NPGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
NPGARCH(1,1) 
Conditional Mean Equation 
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
Property rights (contract-intensive money) 0.07   0.008   -0.01 -0.07 
  23.46***   0.31   1.69* 1.28 
Property rights (investor protection)   0.006   0.006     
    21.79***   12.42***     
Democratic accountability -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.01 -0.007 -0.009 
  8.74*** 8.34*** 1.75* 14.04*** 3.71*** 1.69* 
MACROECONOMIC CONTROLS 
Inflation, year on year -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
  3.59*** 1.79* 3.55*** 1.05 1.39 2.64*** 
Exchange rate change (month on month) 0.0200 0.01 0.0200 0.01 0.02 0.02 
  3.91*** 3.84*** 4.20*** 3.46*** 2.89*** 3.77*** 
Change in industrial production -0.15 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.14 -0.14 
  2.43** 2.79*** 2.53** 2.62*** 1.69* 2.18** 
M2 annual change 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.14 
  4.44*** 6.01*** 4.53*** 3.23*** 2.36** 3.34*** 
EU Accession dummy -0.02 -0.02     -0.02   
  4.54*** 2.26**     1.47   
EU association agreement in force     -0.03 -0.03   -0.03 
      0.97 1.11   1.04 
C 0.006 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.13 
  2.22** 4.93*** 1.92* 5.50*** 9.57*** 3.19*** 
Conditional Variance Equation 
Property Rights (CIM) 0.81   0.45   1.41 0.89 
  1.21   0.81   2.49** 1.68* 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
AR(3)-
APGARCH(1,1) 
AR(1)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
AR(1)-
PGARCH(2,2) 
AR(3)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
NPGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
NPGARCH(1,1) 
SD of Property Rights (CIM), 6 months -1.75   2.28       
  0.23   0.37       
Cumulative Property Rights Changes (CIM), 12 months         2.17 2.56 
          1.73* 2.03** 
Property Rights (Investor Protection)   0.01   0.01     
    3.48***   2.45**     
SD of Property Rights (Investor Protection), 6 months   -0.02   -0.01     
    0.51   0.23     
Democratic Accountability -0.05 -0.008 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 
  1.66* 1.41 2.87*** 2.22** 1.63 2.78*** 
SD of Democratic Accountability, 6 months 0.62 0.18 0.59 0.19 0.52 0.58 
  2.13** 2.60*** 2.31** 2.62*** 1.84* 2.05** 
Leverage effect 1.14 2.94 0.89 3.01 -0.01 -0.44 
 4.59*** 15.61*** 4.65*** 15.39*** 3.09*** 2.64*** 
n 3152 3412 3152 3412 3150 3150 
Macro volatility controls in variance equation? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -1502.597 1585.38 -1518.069 -1589.37 -1453.37 -1462.24 
AIC 0.9680 0.9422 0.9772 0.9451 0.9380 0.9430 
Distribution Student's T Student's T Student's T Student's T Student's T Student's T 
Dependent variable is log stock market returns, with model choice shown above each column of results. Note: absolute values of t-stats are under 
the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at the 1% level. The complete set of macroeconomic variables 
utilized in the conditional mean equation is also included in the conditional variance, but are not shown in consideration of space.  
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Table 4 – Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis – Global Economic Conditions 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
AR(3)-
APGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
EGARCH(1,2) 
AR(3)-
APGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
TGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
TGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-GJR-
GARCH(1,1) 
Conditional Mean Equation 
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
Property rights (contract-intensive money) 0.09   0.07   0.02   
  0.16   4.29***   5.86***   
Property rights (investor protection)   0.010   0.009   0.01 
    51.90***   12.80***   2.81*** 
Democratic accountability -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.01 -0.003 -0.008 
  0.27 14.74*** 1.44 21.66*** 5.20*** 1.33 
MACROECONOMIC CONTROLS 
Inflation, year on year -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
  2.17** 1.85* 3.42*** 5.49*** 2.79*** 1.77* 
Exchange rate change (month on month) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  3.48*** 3.34*** 4.39*** 11.62*** 2.95*** 3.42*** 
Change in industrial production -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 -0.16 -0.20 -0.19 
  2.35** 2.97*** 2.20** 20.06*** 2.27** 3.16*** 
M2 annual change 0.29 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.27 0.16 
  3.07*** 5.88*** 3.58*** 7.90*** 5.13*** 3.10*** 
EU Accession dummy -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
  0.60 4.13*** 1.84* 11.62*** 4.86*** 2.38** 
GFC dummy -0.13 -0.12         
  4.22*** 4.02***         
Gold Returns     -0.45 -0.49     
      3.16*** 27.89***     
S&P 500 Returns         48.56 48.35 
          15.43*** 15.60*** 
C -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.002 0.02 -0.02 
  0.07 9.93*** 0.16 3.17*** 10.03*** 0.47 
Conditional Variance Equation 
GFC dummy 0.89 0.19         
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
AR(3)-
APGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
EGARCH(1,2) 
AR(3)-
APGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
TGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-
TGARCH(1,1) 
AR(3)-GJR-
GARCH(1,1) 
  4.48*** 6.28***         
Gold Volatility     -0.001 -0.003     
      0.61 0.90     
S&P 500 Volatility         70.08 70.13 
          11.27*** 11.48*** 
Property Rights (CIM) 0.51   0.75   -0.11   
  0.74   1.16   0.12   
SD of Property Rights (CIM), 6 months -6.93   -1.72   -19.20   
  0.85   0.23   1.50   
Property Rights (Investor Protection)   0.008   0.07   0.001 
    2.17**   1.90*   0.04 
SD of Property Rights (Investor Protection), 6 months   0.01   0.20   0.12 
    0.25   0.99   0.79 
Democratic Accountability -0.04 -0.006 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 
  1.21 1.29 1.84* 1.92* 1.94* 1.80* 
SD of Democratic Accountability, 6 months 0.71 0.18 0.59 1.13 1.19 1.13 
  2.42** 2.59*** 2.03** 3.23*** 3.30*** 4.03*** 
Leverage effect 0.06 2.92 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.20 
 3.95*** 14.12*** 5.18*** 6.52*** 3.45*** 3.52*** 
n 3152 3412 3152 3412 3152 3412 
Macro volatility controls in variance equation? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -1463.917 1550.15 -1496.206 -1582.80 -1317.78 -1390.66 
AIC 0.9450 0.9230 0.9652 0.9419 0.8514 0.8292 
Distribution Student's T Student's T Student's T Student's T Student's T Student's T 
Dependent variable is log of stock market returns, with model choice shown above each column of results. Note: absolute values of t-stats are 
under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at the 1% level. The complete set of macroeconomic 
variables utilized in the conditional mean equation is also included in the conditional variance, but are not shown in consideration of space.
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Table 5 – Realized Volatility v. Institutional Volatility 
 
Dependent Variable: Realized 
Volatility 
 
1 2 
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES     
Property rights (contract-intensive money) -0.06   
  1.71*   
Property rights (Investor Protection)   -0.002 
    2.57*** 
Democratic accountability -0.004 -0.005 
  0.97 3.68*** 
SD of Property Rights (CIM), 6 months 0.50   
  2.08**   
SD of Property Rights (Investor Protection), 6 months   0.004 
    1.07 
SD of Democratic Accountability, 6 months 0.02 0.03 
  1.92* 2.54** 
MACROECONOMIC CONTROLS     
Inflation, year on year 0.002 0.001 
  3.59*** 2.08** 
Exchange rate change (month on month) -0.001 -0.004 
  1.53 1.37 
Change in industrial production 0.02 0.02 
  2.60** 2.47** 
M2 annual change 0.02 0.03 
  1.09 3.10*** 
EU Accession dummy -0.001 -0.004 
  0.39 1.37 
S&P Volatility 3.17 3.30 
  20.64*** 22.66*** 
C 0.11 0.09 
  3.10*** 7.76*** 
n 2258 2367 
r-squared 0.28 0.33 
OLS model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and country fixed-effects measuring realized 
volatility (left-hand side) as a function of the full robustness model of Table 4 (right-hand side 
variables). Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying 
significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at the 1% level. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 – Underlying Data Description and Sources 
Data Description Source 
Financial Market Variables 
Stock market data     
Belarus Belarus Stock Exchange Index, 2005-May 2017 CEIC database and personal correspondence 
Bosnia Sarajevo Stock Exchange BIFX Index, 2006-May 2017 Sarajevo Stock Exchange website 
Bulgaria SOFIX Index, 2000-May 2017 Bulgarian Stock Exchange website 
Croatia CROBEX Stock Market Index, 1997-May 2017 Datastream 
Czech Republic Prague Stock Exchange PX Index, 1994-May 2017 Bloomberg 
Estonia 
Talinn Stock Market Index; TALSE 1996-2004, OMX 2004-
May 2017 
Datastream 
Hungary Budapest Stock Exchange BUX Index, 1997-May 2017 Bloomberg 
Kazakhstan MSCI Kazakhstan Total Market Index, 2000-May 2017 Datastream 
Kyrgyz Republic Kyrgyz Stock Exchange Share Price Index, 2009-May 2017 
Kyrgyz Stock Exchange website, personal 
correspondence 
Latvia Riga Stock Exchange OMX Index, 2000-May 2017 NASDAQ OMX website 
Lithuania Vilnius Stock Exchange OMX Index, 2000-May 2017 NASDAQ OMX website 
Macedonia Macedonian Stock Exchange MBI Index, 2005-May 2017 Datastream 
Mongolia 
Mongolian Stock Exchange MSE Top-20 Index, 1995-May 
2017 
CEIC database 
Poland 
Warsaw Stock Exchange WIG Total Stock Index, 1991-May 
2017 
Bloomberg 
Romania 
Bucharest Stock Exchange Trading Index (BET), 1997-May 
2017 
Datastream 
Russia Moscow Exchange RTS Index, 1995-May 2017 Datastream 
Serbia MSCI Serbia Stock Market Index, 2008-May 2017 Datastream 
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Data Description Source 
Slovakia Bratislava Stock Exchange SAX Index, 1993-May 2017 Datastream 
Slovenia 
Ljubljana Stock Exchange SBI TOP Blue Chip Index, 2003-
May 2017 
Bloomberg 
Ukraine Ukraine Stock Exchange PFTS Index, 1997-May 2017 CEIC Database 
Institutional Variables 
Contract-intensive money 
Calculated as in the text as M2 less the money held outside 
formal financial institutions as a percentage of M2 
IMF International Financial Statistics; Bank of 
Mongolia website; National Bank of Croatia 
website, Bank of Latvia website 
Investor Protection 
Original ICRG index, coded 0 to 12, comprising three sub-
components: contract viability/expropriation, profits 
repatriation, and payment delays. Higher numbers indicate 
better property rights. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Democratic Accountability 
A measure of how responsive government is to its people, 
coded from 0 to 6 with 6 representing full democracy and 0 
autarky. 
ICRG 
Macroeconomic Variables  
Industrial Production, % change Percentage change month on month, industrial production 
index 
IMF IFS, Eurostat, Central Statistical Agencies 
Real Exchange Rate change Percentage change in the real effective exchange rate Darvas (May 2017); IMF IFS 
Money growth Change in M2 over same period in the previous year IMF IFS; Bank of Latvia; National Bank of Croatia 
Inflation year on year Inflation rate, change over same period in previous year 
IMF IFS; Economist Intelligence Unit; Various 
national banks 
EU accession 
Dummy coded at 1 the month a country joined the EU (and 
every month thereafter) and 0 otherwise 
Author’s calculations 
EU Association Agreement 
Dummy coded at 1 if a country signed an AA and switching 
to zero when that country joined the EU (or remaining at 1 if 
accession has still not occurred) 
Author’s calculations 
Global Controls 
Price of Gold Spot price of gold as of last day of the month, US$ World Gold Council website 
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Data Description Source 
Gold Price Volatility 
Month-to-month volatility of returns to gold holdings, 
computed as square of log returns over the month.  
Author’s calculations 
S&P 500 Index 
Difference between close of day price and previous day's 
closing price.  
Bloomberg 
S&P Volatility Squared sum of log returns monthly. Author’s calculations 
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A Note on the Property Rights Measures 
The two measures for property rights, given that they measure different facets of property rights 
protection, need not overlap perfectly. In fact, a simple Spearman correlation test between the 
two indicators shows that there is mildly strong, but not perfect, correlation between the two 
variables (r=0.2709). Taken as a country-by-country pairwise correlation, there is substantial 
divergence between the two variables, from a low of -0.6562 for Bulgaria (meaning that, as 
legislative frameworks get better, there is no guarantee that property rights did) to a high of 
0.8571 for Estonia (signaling that administrative implementation of rights moved in tandem with 
the legal framework). In this sense, the two variables are used to bracket the concept of property 
rights econometrically: either we observe the inputs of property rights (laws) or we observe its 
outputs (more confidence in banking institutions), but we never actually observe property rights. 
This reality means that inputs and outputs need not necessarily match, especially true in a 
transition context. 
 
Moreover, it is possible that perhaps one or both of these property rights indicators could capture 
general uncertainty in the economy or macroeconomic trends and not property rights per se.
10
 
However, this also appears not to be the case in this dataset, as the pooled correlations between 
property rights and the market returns metric noted above is -0.0007 for contract-intensive 
money and -0.0054 for investor protection, suggesting instead an almost wholly inconsequential 
relationship between property rights and market returns. Similar but slightly stronger negative 
correlations are obtained when utilizing realized volatility (approximately -0.20 for both 
                                                          
10
 Thanks are due to a thorough anonymous referee who pointed this out. 
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indicator), adding more credibility to these indicators capturing actual property rights rather than 
simply macroeconomic conditions or volatility.
11
  
 
Macroeconomic Controls 
Due to the difficulties of finding monthly macroeconomic data in transition economies, the set of 
controls for the regressions shown in the paper is necessarily somewhat parsimonious; in one 
sense, this is hopefully forgivable, as the purpose of this paper is not to reconfirm previous 
results regarding the effects of macroeconomic variables. But as a full picture of institutional 
volatility is not complete without these established determinants of volatility, in addition to the 
variables shown above, various other macroeconomic indicators were attempted in both this 
paper and the earlier, working version of this research. Measures of financial depth, financial 
liberalization, interest rates, and openness were contemplated (and constructed) as a control for 
this examination, but the incredible paucity of monthly data in these areas, especially in the early 
years of transition, also made for a rather significant loss of observations, with little 
improvement of the model. Finally, similar issues were found while searching for a complete set 
of controls as in Paye (2012), in regard to highly detailed firm or bank data; much of the data 
was simply not feasible for this exercise, as such data was impossible to come by at such a high 
frequency in the early years of transition. Some data would have been available for only the 
“standout” countries (Poland and the Czech Republic, for example), introducing a measure of 
reverse causality into the analysis, i.e. the only countries able to have a full complement of 
macroeconomic controls were also those with the best-performing institutions.  
                                                          
11
 The institutional volatility metrics, described below, also have little to no correlation with the financial volatility 
or market return indicators. Six-month volatility of contract-intensive money correlates only at 0.28 with (realized) 
market volatility and 0.04 with market returns, while the measure of investor protection volatility correlates at 
between -0.01 and -0.02 for market volatility and market returns. 
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